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The term "sexual harassment" is appearing more often both in the media and
in common speech. Unfortunately, not all who use the term are quite sure what
constitutes sexual harassment. Both men and women in the workplace live in
increasing fear that a comment or gesture will be misinterpreted by a co-worker
or subordinate.' Recent incidents involving "sexual harassment" at the
elementary and junior high school levels reflect the pervasiveness of the fear of
this phenomenon in our society.2 As the number of sexual harassment claims
continues to rise, employers and authority figures are beginning to take steps to
ensure that they are insulated from liability. Employers have begun to educate
their employees on the adverse effects of certain sexually harassing behaviors on
other employees and the workplace. 3 Since not all sexually oriented conduct
rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment,4 guidance often comes from
judicial decisions that deal with sexual harassment.
The courts have defined a test for determining whether an employee has
suffered sexual harassment.5 Simply put, for behavior to rise to the level of legal
1. See generally Margaret S. Stockade, The Role of Sexual Misperceptions of Women's
Friendliness in an Emerging Theory of Sexual Harassment. J. Vocational Behav. 42. 84-101 (1993).
2. There have been many recent Incidents involving school-age children and sexual harassment
claims. Recent cases include a fifth-grader suspended for sexual harassment (see Lily Dizon, 5th
Grader Suspended for Sexual Harassment. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 1996. at B4); a first-grader
punished for kissing a classmate (see Pamela Warrick, The Buss Fuss With a Simple Kiss, a First.
Grader Has Sparked a Debate on How to Teach Kids to Respect One Another, Los Angeles Times,
Sept. 27, 1996, at El).
3. The five-prong test for determining whether sexual harassment has occurred is used for
"hostile work environment" sexual harassment cases. This form of sexual harassment can be
distinguished from quid pro quo sexual harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment ("something for
something") occurs when the employer withholds an economic benefit in exchange for a favor which
is sexual in nature. This paper will focus on hostile work environment sexual harassment, its effects
on employees, and the problems in applying this five-prong test.
In recent years, programs to educate employers and employees on avoiding sexual harassment have
begun to appear. The Teamsters Union began distribution of a booklet on how to prevent sexual
harassment in 1994. There are now half day corporate training programs for recognizing and
avoiding sexual harassment, and a non-profit organization, The Coalition to Stop Sexual Harassment,
has been formed. See Joyce L. Kennedy, Sexual Harassment is a Problem that Refuses to Die, Star-
Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sunday, April 9, 1995, at JI, Ellen Neuborne, Sex Harassment Suits
Soar: Complaints High from Women in Blue-Collar Jobs, USA Today. Friday, May 3, 1996, at Al.
4. Sexually oriented behavior may be offensive without meeting all of the criteria necessary
to prevail on a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al.,
Measuring Sexual Harassment: Theoretical and Psychometric Advances, 17(4) Basic and Applied
Soc. Psychol. 425, 429-30 (1995).
5. In order to prove that sexual harassment has occurred, a claimant must prove: 1) the
employee was in a protected group; 2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment- and 5) if recovery is sought against any entity other than the directly abusive person,
respondeat superior. See infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
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sexual harassment, the conduct must be unwelcome and must alter the conditions
of employment. The current test judges the behavior from both an objective and
subjective standpoint: the conduct must be such that a reasonable person would
find that the conduct created an abusive environment, and the claimant herself must
have subjectively perceived the conduct to be abusive.6
This paper analyzes a recent Eleventh Circuit case, Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,' which raises the question of what moment in time an employee must
subjectively perceive the abusiveness of her environment in order to prevail on a
Title VII sexual harassment claim. It examines the policies behind Title VII and
the inclusion of the subjective prong, and the functions that the subjective prong
play in the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim. It also examines the
psychological effects of sexual harassment on women and how these effects impact
women's perceptions of the sexually hostile workplace. Finally, it explores the
possibility of modifying or eliminating this requirement as an element of theprima
facie claim.
I. FACTS: FARAGHER v. CITY OF BocA RATON
Plaintiffs, two former city lifeguards, brought action against the city of Boca
Raton for sexual harassment under section 1983,8 with one plaintiff claiming
sexual harassment under Title VII.9 Of the forty to fifty lifeguards employed by
the City, only four to six were female."° Plaintiffs shared locker rooms and
showers with their male co-employees, a situation which led to a "rambunctious
atmosphere" in the tight working quarters." Plaintiffs claimed they were
subjected to various incidents of sexual harassment perpetrated by two supervisors
of the lifeguards. Incidents included "uninvited and offensive touching," (pressing
up of supervisor against plaintiff's buttocks while simulating sexual movement),
as well as offensive comments and gestures (examples include: "If you had tits I
would do you in a minute" and "There are a lot of tits on the beach today.").' 2
Neither plaintiff complained to the Parks and Recreation Department; 3 however,
6. See infra text accompanying notes 68-80 for a discussion of Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
This paper will be limited in scope to an examination of heterosexual sexual harassment: more
particularly, the harassment by men against women. While the author recognizes that same sex
sexual harassment is also a increasingly reported phenomenon, the facts of Faragher raise interesting
questions about the psychological element involved in sexual harassment. Since the main body of
scientific research concerns the effect of sexual harassment on women, the analysis of the paper will
be limited to these facts.
7. 76 F.3d 1155 (1th Cir.). opinion vacated and reh'8 granted. 83 F.3d 1346 (1996).
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id at 1157.
II. Id at 1157.
12. I at 1158.
13. Id
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both decided to speak to one supervisor about the incident because they held him
in high repute. Since plaintiffs did not speak to him on a "subordinate to superior
basis," the supervisor did not report the incidents to the City.
14
In time, plaintiff Ewanchew left her job as lifeguard for other employment,
but later requested re-employment on a part-time basis. Plaintiff Faragher also
left her job, but her decision to leave was unrelated to the sexual harassment she
experienced."t After she left, Faragher did not discourage her sister from
seeking employment as a lifeguard for the City. Some time later, based on the
incidents they experienced during their employment, both women sued the City,
claiming sexual harassment, battery, and negligent retention and supervision of
one of the offenders.' 6
The district court found for plaintiffs on their battery claims, and upheld
Faragher's section 1983 claim against her harassers. 7 Ewanchew, on the other
hand, was out of luck. Finding her request for re-employment made it "illogical
to find a perception of hostility in the work environment," the court held that
Ewanchew had not subjectively perceived her work environment to be abusive
and, therefore, was not entitled to recovery.'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding the district court did not err in finding
that Ewanchew had not shown she had subjectively perceived the conduct as
harassing at the time of her employment. 9 Because Ewanchew did not
"perceive her environment to be abusive ... [the] conduct did not alter the
conditions of her employment.""
Held: An after-the-fact realization of the offensiveness of certain conduct
was "irrelevant to whether the employee's conditions of employment were
altered," and therefore plaintiff Ewanchew had not subjectively perceived her
conduct to be abusive.2'
1. BACKGROUND LAW: MERITOR SAVNGS BANK, FSB V. VINSOV, HARRIS V.
FORKLIFT SySTEMs, INC. AND THE RISE OF THE "SUBJECrIVE PRONG"
A. The Establishment of the Title VII "Hostile Work Environment" Claim
The basis of sexual discrimination in the workplace as a viable cause of
action is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The purpose of
14. Id.
15. She eventually found her way to law school.
16. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
17. Id at 1164-68.
18. Famgher, 76 F.3d at 1161 (11th Cir. 1996).
19. Id at 1155.
20. Id at 1161.
21. Id.
22. The pertinent section reads: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for the
employee--() to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
1345IM9]
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Title VII is to "assure equality in the quality of employment opportunities and
to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified job environments .. .."23 Sexual discrimination under Title
VII is divided into claims based on gender and claims based on sex.' Claims
based on gender arise when a person is denied a privilege of employment
because of his or her gender.25 Sexual harassment claims (claims based on sex)
involve sexual conduct directed toward an employee.26 Sexual harassment
claims (which are far more prevalent than claims based on gender) are divided
into two groups, quid pro quo claims and hostile work environment claims.27
In 1976, the D.C. Circuit decided Williams v. Saxbe, ' the first case to
recognize a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. Williams and its progeny
dealt with quid pro quo harassment claims. Quid pro quo claims deal with
situations in Which the employee is asked to give "something" (usually in the
form of sexual favors) in return for job-related benefits (promotion, retention of
job, etc.).29 By the end of the 1970s, the quid pro quo claim was generally
accepted as actionable under Title VII.0
The courts were slower in recognizing a more subtle form of discrimina-
tion-discrimination where the plaintiff did not allege a "tangible" economic loss
in a "quid pro quo" harassment claim, but alleged harassment resulting from a
discriminatory work environment that affected the conditions of employment.3 1
The first discrimination claims alleging a discriminatory work environment arose
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Ironically, the original bill proposed did not include "sex." Its inclusion
was part of a last-minute effort on the part of several senators who wished to defeat the bill and its
anti-race discrimination provisions. The bill, as we know, passed anyway, leaving room for
speculation as to Congress' intent in including "sex" in Title VII. See generally B. Glenn George,
The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 14 n.12 (1993); Lori A.
Mazur, Comment, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Keeping the Status Quo, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 291
(1994).
23. George, supra note 22 at I (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 800,
93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973)).
24. See Barbara L. Zalucki, Comment, Discrimination Law-Defining the Hostile Work
Environment Claim of Sexual Harassment under Title VII, II W. New Eng. L. Rev. 143, 148-48
(1989) (discussing the gradual inclusion of sexual harassment as a sexual discrimination claim);
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 816-17 (1991).
25. Zalucki. supra note 24, at 147-48.
26. id.
27. See Zalucki, supra note 24.
28. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For other examples of early sexual harassment claims,
see Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). For a good overview of the history of the sexual harassment claim,
see Zalucki, supra note 24.
29. There is also a reverse form of "quid pro quo" claim that consists of the employer denying
an employee an employment benefit because employee refuses to engage in sexual conduct. See
Mazur, supra note 22. at 300.
30. See generally Zalucki, supra note 24.
31. See Mazur, supra note 22, at 293-95.
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in the context of race discrimination, which was the primary concern of Title VII
when passed.32 This form of discrimination, which is now called "hostile work
environment," was first recognized in Rogers v. EEOC.33 In Rogers, plaintiff, a
Hispanic-American employee of Texas State Optical, brought a claim against her
employer, alleging that she was exposed to "abuse" by co-employees, and that she
was required to attend to patients only of a certain ethnic origin. The Fifth Circuit
found that the abusive environment and systematic segregation of Hispanic patients
sufficiently altered the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" so as to
constitute a valid discrimination claim.' The court found that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to be accorded a "liberal interpretation" so as "to
effectuate the purpose of Congress" of eliminating ethnic discrimination. 35 If such
conduct was not discouraged, "[o]ne could readily envision working environments
so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers.... ."I
The courts gradually expanded the concept of the "hostile work environ-
ment" claims to Title VII sex discrimination claims.3' In 1982, the Eleventh
Circuit, in Henson v. City of Dundee,38 systematically defined the elements
necessary to prevail in a hostile work environment claim. According to Henson,
an employee must prove: (1) the employee was in a protected group; (2) the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment; and, if recovery is sought against the employer, (5) the employer
knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct (respondeat
superior)." These factors were adopted in other circuits and became the test
for determining whether plaintiffs could recover on hostile work environment
sexual harassment claims. '
The viability of the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim was
established definitively in the Supreme Court's first decision on any sexual
32. Id.
33. 454 P.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S. Ct. 2058 (1972).
34. Id. at 238.
35. IS
36. Id
37. See. e.g.. Bundy v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). for court's expansion of hostile
work environment claim to sexual harassment.
38. 682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982).
39. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. Many of the factors the Eleventh Circuit developed in Henson
were taken from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines.
The fifth element of this test is a complex one, consisting of both an agency basis of liability and
a notice basis. For a discussion of this element see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 P.3d 1155,
1163-67 (1 th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the confusion created by the Supreme Court in Meritor
Sav. Bark, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) and the standards used to impose
employer liability in a hostile work environment sexual harassment cases, see David B. Oppenheimer.
Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed
by Their Supervisors, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 66 (1995).
40. See Mazur, supra note 22, at 305-07.
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harassment claim, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.4  In an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court relied on the Guidelines promulgated by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to find that Title VII encom-
passed claims for a hostile work environment. 2 The Court stated that "[s]ince
the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment."' 3
Meritor involved a suit by a bank employee, Vinson, against her former
employer in which the employee alleged that "she had 'constantly been subjected
to sexual harassment"' by Taylor, her supervisor, in violation of Title VII.'
Over a period of four years, Vinson estimated that she had submitted to Taylor's
sexual demands forty to fifty times, endured his exposing himself to her, and
even suffered forcible rape on several occasions."' The bank argued, and the
district court agreed, that since Vinson's submission to Taylor's sexual advances
was "voluntary," Taylor's conduct was not "unwelcome,"" and thus plaintiff
had failed to establish one element of the hostile work environment claim.47
The Court rejected this argument, stating that the lower court had "erroneously
focused on the 'voluntariness' of respondent's participation in the sexual
conduct."'4 Admitting that the question of whether the conduct was unwelcome
or not would normally be a difficult one, based largely on credibility determina-
tions, the Court stated that the correct inquiry was "whether respondent by her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary."' 9 The Court further
held that the determination of whether the conduct was unwelcome or not, and thus
the determination of the validity of plaintiff's claim, became a question to be
evaluated by the "totality of the circumstances" of the working environment.50
The Court in Meritor clarified another issue that had been troubling the
courts in sexual harassment cases: what effect (damage) was necessary to show
that the harassment had altered a "term, condition, or privilege" of employ-
ment.5' The bank had argued that'Congress' intent in using the phrase had
41. 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
42. The role of the EEOC in promulgating guidelines was established by Congress in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC regulations have played an important role in the development of
Title VII claims. Since the legislative intent was clear that these guidelines should determine the
scope of Title VII, the courts have generally looked to these guidelines to determine the standards
for sexual harassment. See supra note 39 for a discussion of Henson v. City of Dundee.
43. 477 U.S. at 64, 106 S. Ct. at 2404.
44. Id at 60, 106 S. Ct. at 2402.
45. Id
46. Id at 61, 106 S. Ct. at 2402-03.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 69. 106 S. Ci. at 2406.
49. Id
50. 14 at 67, 106 S. Ct. at 2405.
51. Id at 64, 106 S. Ct. at 2404.
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been to prevent "tangible loss of an economic character" resulting from sexual
harassment, and not "purely psychological aspects of the workplace environ-
ment."' 2 The Court rejected this argument, finding that the language of Title
VII did not limit its application to "economic or tangible discrimination,""P
3
stating that "[the phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' evinces
a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women' in employment."'-
Meritor, in adopting the five-prong test from the EEOC guidelines on sexual
harassment, firmly established and defined the "hostile work environment" claim
under Title VII. It represented the culmination of the evolution of the sexual
harassment claim from exclusively "quid pro quo" claims to "hostile work
environment claims," and from the tangible economic effects resulting from the
quid pro quo claim to psychological and emotional effects of the hostile
environment claim.5s
B. From Meritor to Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
Although Meritor listed the elements of the "hostile work environment"
sexual harassment claim, differences in interpretation soon arose among the
circuits on the standard to be used in evaluating the factors set forth in Meritor.
The fourth prong of the test set forth in Meritor, that the conduct in question
altered "a term, condition, or privilege of employment," was the center of
debate." The federal circuits divided on two issues: (1) from whose viewpoint
the offensive conduct should be evaluated; and (2) the effect of the conduct on
the plaintiff (or injury plaintiff suffered). 7
This division was reflected in two cases: Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co.'s and Ellison v. Brady.'9 The court in Rabidue determined whether the
conduct affected a "term, condition, or privilege of employment" (the fourth
prong of the test set forth in Henson) from both an objective and subjective
standpoint.60 According to Rabidue, the plaintiff would be required to show
that not only was she "actually offended by the defendant's conduct," but also
that a "hypothetical reasonable individual's work performance ... and
52. Id
53. Id
54. Id (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart. 435 U.S. 702. 707 n.13, 98
S. C. 1370, 1375. n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971))).
55. 510 U.S. 17, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
56. For a good discussion of the split in the circuits, see Sharon J. Bittner, The Reasonable
Woman Standard After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Debate Rages On, 16 Women's Rts.
L. Rep. 127 (1994).
57. Id
58. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041. 107 S. Ct. 1983 (i987).
59. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
60. 805 F.2d at 620.
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psychological well-being" would be affected. 6' Thus, Rabidue created a two-
prong standard by which to judge whether the conduct was severe enough to
alter the work environment. Once the conduct was found to be so severe as to
have altered a "term, condition, or privilege of employment," the plaintiff,
according to the court in Rabidue, must also show that she suffered "some
degree of injury" in order to recover.'
In Ellison v. Brady,8 the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected Rabidue's two-
prong test for determining the severity of the harassment and adopted in its place
the "reasonable victim's perspective."'" Ellison also rejected Rabidue's
requirement that the plaintiff suffer psychological injury before recovering on a
sexual harassment claim.' Rabidue and Ellison set off an intense debate among
scholars on the proper standard for judging sexual harassment cases." It became
apparent, by 1993, that there was a pressing need for the Supreme Court to clarify
inconsistencies that had developed among the circuits after Meritor.
67
The Supreme Court's response came in the long-awaited Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc." There, plaintiff Harris was the target of frequent unwanted sexual
innuendoes by Hardy, the company's president. In front of others, Hardy would
comment: "You're a woman, what do you know" and "We need a man as the
rental manager."' 9 He also told her that she was a "dumbass woman," and on one
occasion suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate
61. 1d
62. I
63. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
64. 14 at 879.
65. 1d at 877.
66. After Rabidue, there was an explosion of literature pushing for the "reasonable woman"
standard (see, e.g., Penny L. Cigoy, Comment, Harmless Amusement or Sexual Harassment?: The
Reasonableness of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 1071 (1993); Sally A. Piefer,
Comment, Sexual Harassment from the Victim's Perspective: The Need for the Seventh Circuit to
Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 85 (1993)); the "reasonable victim"
standard (see, e.g., Jolynn Childers. Note. Is There Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A
Discussion of Recent Developments In Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 Duke L.J. 854
(1993); Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual
and Racial Harassment Ltlgation, I Tex. J. Women & L. 95 (1992)); as well as literature supporting
the "reasonable person" standard (see, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical
and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61
Fordham L. Rev. 773 (1993)).
67. A sampling of the different standards applied by the circuits include: Bums v. McGregor
Indus., Inc. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasonable woman); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (reasonable woman under like conditions); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding,
Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (1 th Cir. 1989) (reasonable person in plaintiff's position); Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (both male and female perspectives). For a good discussion
of the different perspectives, see Lori A. Mazur, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Keeping the Status
Quo. 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 291 (1994); Marie E. Kaiser & Anthony J. LaPorta, Sexual Harassment of
Women in the Workplace: He Said, She Said. 7 St. John's J. Legal Comment 627 (1992).
68. 510 U.S. 17, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
69. 14 at 19, 114 S. Ct. at 369.
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[Harris'] raise."7 After Harris confronted him about the conduct, Hardy promised
to stop such behavior, but a month later made similar comments.7 Harris quit her
job.
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor for a unanimous Court, the Court
found that Harris was entitled to recover under Title VII in this "close case. 72
More importantly, the Court responded to many of the questions that had been
debated in the circuits for years. First, it affirmed the two-prong objec-
tive/subjective standard of Rabidue."3 The conduct in question must be severe
enough to create a work environment that a "reasonable person" would find hostile
or abusive.74 But if "the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment
to be abusive, [then] the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim's employment."75
Having thus enunciated the standard by which to judge the conduct, the Court
addressed the factors to consider when determining whether the conduct has
affected, according to Title VII terminology, "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." 7 Rejecting Rabidue's requirement of psychological injury,77 the
Court stated that
[c]ertainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable
person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such
conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and
is perceived, as hostile or abusive ... there is no need for it also to be
psychologically injurious.78
The Court rejected the idea that a precise mathematical formula could be found to
evaluate sexual harassment, and stated that the environment could be evaluated
only by "looking at all the circumstances."" The factors to be considered include:
"the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreason-
ably interferes with an employee's work performance.""
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg concurred in separate opinions. In his opinion,
Justice Scalia presented the problems inherent in defining the vague term
"abusiveness." 8' He compared the vagueness of the term "abusiveness" with
70. Id
71. Id.
72. id at 20, 114 S. Ct. at 369.
73. Id. at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
74. Id at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
75. Id
76. Id. at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
77. Id. at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370 ("ride VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads
to a nervous breakdown.").
78. Id at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
79. Id at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 24, 114 S. Ct. at 372.
19971
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"negligence" by stating that "what constitutes 'negligence' (a traditional jury
question) is not much more clear and certain than what constitutes 'abusive-
ness."'2 However, as he pointed out, recovery for negligence is "limited to those
who have suffered harm." 3 In the Title VII context, "abusiveness" itself becomes
"the test of whether legal harm has been suffered, [thus) opening more expansive
vistas of litigation."" The idea that an employer would be punished just for the
abusiveness of the environment, and not just the harm suffered, was a chief concern
for Justice Scalia."
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurrence, focused on what effect the harassment
must have on the plaintiff in order for her to recover." Citing Davis v.
Monsanto,7 she determined that the plaintiff "need not prove that his or her
tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment," but merely that the
conduct so alters working conditions as to "make it more difficult to do the job.''ta
Justice Ginsburg, like Justice Scalia, was concerned with what actual harm must be
suffered by the plaintiff in order to recover.89 While Justice Scalia was wary of
the idea of using a vague concept of "abusiveness" of environment to determine
liability at all, Justice Ginsburg adopted a broad definition of an abusive work
environment that would open the vistas of litigation that Scalia so feared.'
Harris established the objective/subjective test for evaluating the abusiveness
of the environment as the standard in judging whether conduct is sufficiently severe
or pervasive so as to be actionable under Title VII. However, the Court did not
make it clear when a Title VII plaintiff must subjectively perceive the environment
to be hostile or abusive. Several post-Harris cases raise the issue of how and when
the subjective prong can be fulfilled.
C. Post-Harris Cases and the Subjective Prong
Two cases, Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.,91 and Kimzey
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' address the role of the subjective prong in determin-
82. Id at 24, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J.. concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id at 24-25. 114 S. Ct. at 372. Justice Scalia would like to use one factor as a measure
for harassment-"whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's performance"-to
create a measure of certainty and to serve as a greater guide for juries in determining sexual
harassment cases, but backs off, admitting there is no support for this single-factor test.
86. Id. at 25, 114 S. Ct. at 372-73.
87. Id. at 25, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (quoting Davis v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
88. Id. at 25, 114 S. Ct. at 372. Justice Ginsburg was concerned with what constituted
unreasonable interference with the employee's performance.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995).
92. 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
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ing whether the plaintiff's work environment has been altered. The issues
presented by these cases include: (1) whether subjective perception of conduct
directed toward other women can sufficiently alter the "terms, conditions, and
privileges" of employment (what the victim must perceive); and (2) whether an
after-the fact subjective realization of the offensiveness of the conduct can satisfy
the subjective perception prong required by Harris (when the victim must
perceive the harassing conduct).
In Hirase-Dol v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.," plaintiff sued for sexual
harassment based on the actions of one of defendant's employees."6 The
employee, Coleman, not only engaged in sexually offensive behavior towards
plaintiff (including incidents in which he made verbal and written remarks,
propositioned plaintiff, and attempted to touch her breast) but he also "engaged
in sexually offensive behavior towards numerous ... women in the [work]
area '6 during the same period. U.S. West argued that evidence of incidents
involving other women should not have been presented as plaintiff could not rely
on evidence of harassment of other workers in establishing a "hostile work
environment" claim.'
The court, however, disagreed. While pointing out that such evidence in the
case at hand was unnecessary, as plaintiff Hirase-Doi had herself been harassed,
the court stated that "evidence of a general work atmosphere, including evidence
of harassment of other women, may be considered in evaluating a claim."'
Use of such evidence was limited to incidents of harassment of which "she was
aware during the time she was allegedly subject to a hostile work environ-
ment."99 As the court stated, "Doi could not subjectively perceive Coleman's
behavior towards others as creating a hostile work environment unless she knew
about the behavior." '°° But since the plaintiff in Hirase-Doi was aware of the
behavior of others, she could rely on evidence of harassment of other women in
the workplace "to the extent that it affected her general work atmosphere."' 0 '
The court in Hirase-Doi makes it clear that actual, subjective perception of
the acts that create the hostile work environment is a must under the Harris test.
If not, a hostile workplace is not created. However, the acts in question need not
necessarily be directed at the plaintiff herself. To recover for an alteration of the
workplace environment, it is enough that the plaintiff subjectively perceive the
whole work environment, which includes comments made to co-workers, as
abusive.
93. See Kimzey. 907 F. Supp. at 1312-13; Hirase-Doi. 61 .F.3d at 782.
94. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995).
95. Hirase-Dot, 61 F.3d at 780.
96. Id. at 780-81.
97. d. at 782.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id
101. Id.
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While Hlrase-Doi addressed the issue of what plaintiff must actually
perceive, Klmzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."02 dealt with the question of time of
perception of such conduct. In Klmzey, the plaintiff brought a hostile work
environment claim, alleging that her manager treated men "as friends and with
respect while women were treated as inferior."' 03 She testified that she often
felt "humiliated," "stupid," "degraded," and "offended" because of his behav-
ior.'O0 Defendant argued that the plaintiff should not prevail on her claim as
her comments and conduct suggested that she did not subjectively believe that
a hostile work environment existed."°s More specifically, defendant relied on
plaintiff's own testimony that plaintiff enjoyed the atmosphere prior to a certain
date and "saw nothing sexually offensive or hostile about the receiving
department,"'" as proof that plaintiff did not subjectively perceive the conduct
to be harassing. The court rejected the defendant's argument, finding that
plaintiff was not required to "form a well-defined, subjective belief of hostility
at the exact moment when an incident occurrs." 07 In doing so, the court
speculated on the reasons for plaintiff's delayed realization of the abusiveness of
the conduct:
One could easily imagine a victim at first not wanting to believe that an
employer was engaging in hostile behavior, or even wanting to ignore
the situation hoping it was merely a misunderstanding, and then upon
reflection or after a series of events determining that she was indeed a
victim of harassment.108
This is significant as it shows the court's willingness to consider why the victim
did not immediately perceive the conduct to be abusive, and its consideration of
the psychological process which leads a victim to conclude that a sexually
harassing workplace exists.
Both Hirase-Doi and Kimzey illustrate a recent trend in the post-Harris
cases-the trend by the defendant to attack plaintiff's claim on the basis that
plaintiff did not subjectively perceive the conduct to be harassing. Hirase-Doi
makes it clear that the conduct must be perceived first-hand by the plaintiff;
however, the conduct perceived need not be directed at plaintiff. The holding
in Kimzey makes it clear that the subjective perception of abusiveness need not
be contemporaneous with the harassing conduct, but may occur at some point
later in the employment. The question left open after Kimzey is whether an
after-the-fact determination that harassing conduct rose to the level of sexual
102. 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
103. Id at 1313.
104. Id
105. Id at 1312.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id at 1312-13.
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harassment may occur after the victim has left her employment."° This is
precisely the issue presented in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton."0
III. DISCUSSION
As seen in the earlier discussion of the facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit
held that an after-employment subjective realization of the offensiveness of the
harassing conduct is not sufficient to satisfy the subjective prong of the Harris
test."'
t
In the district court opinion,"' Ewanchew was deemed not to have
sufficiently shown that the "uninvited touching on the buttocks and on one
breast" had affected a "term, condition, or privilege of employment."...3 The
court believed her account of her supervisors' behavior, but found "her present
assertion" that she found such conduct intolerable at the time "not credible."" 4
"Indeed, Ewanchew's request for a part-time job after she left the City's employ
makes it illogical to find a perception of hostility in the work environment on her
part.""' Citing Harris, the court stated that unless the plaintiff subjectively
perceives the work environment to be hostile, the offensive conduct has not
actually altered a "term, condition, or privilege of employment" necessary to
prevail on a Title VII claim."'
The Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the decision of the trial court, referred to
Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."' The court noted that Kimzey interpreted
Harris as not requiring a "well-defined, subjective belief of hostility at the exact
moment when an incident occurs."' a Stating that 'lan employee's conditions
of employment are not affected by what happens after she resigns,"'' 9 the court
held that an "[alfter-the-fact realization of the offensiveness of conduct thus does
not satisfy Harris; it is irrelevant to whether the employee's conditions of
employment were altered."'20 In affirming the district court, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to expand the holding in Kimzey (that an after-the-fact realization
of the abusiveness of the conduct may satisfy the subjective prong of the Harris
test) to after-the-fact realizations that occur after the employment is terminated.
109. See supra text accompanying note 94-106.
110. 76 F.3d. 1155 (11th Cir.), opinion vacated and reh'g granted, 83 F.3d 1346 (1996).
111. See Infra text accompanying notes 19-21.
112. 864 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
113. Id. at 1566-67.
114. ld. at 1567.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
118. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 P.3d 1155, 1161 (1 th Cir.), opinion vacated and reh'g
granted, 83 F.3d 1346 (1996).
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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However, the court sustained the district court's finding that plaintiff
Faragher's subjective perception of the workplace was sufficient to alter the "terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."'21  It did so despite the City's
contentions that Faragher's "apparent nonchalance" about her supervisors' conduct,
her failure to complain, and her failure to caution her sister about applying for ajob
as a lifeguard with the City illustrated that she could not have found the environ-
ment abusive." Since the district court had come to this decision by relying
extensively on the credibility of Faragher's testimony, the appellate court was
unwilling to find manifest error in this factual determination.1 3
The court's finding that one plaintiff subjectively perceived the workplace to
be hostile while the other did not illustrates the difficulty in making such
determinations. As seen above, much of this determination ultimately centers on
a credibility call by the factfinder. The district court in Faragher believed
Ewanchew's allegations of the conduct of the harassers, but did not find credible
her "'then' feeling of intolerability."'24 However, Faragher is significant not just
because it illustrates such difficulties, but also because it raises some important
questions on the role of the subjective prong in the hostile work environment sexual.
harassment claim. The court's assertion in Faragher that post-employment
realization of the abusiveness of harassing conduct is "irrelevant" to whether the
employee's workplace was altered'2 should be examined in light of the policies
underlying the Title VII claim and the subjective prong itself.
A. The Hostile Work Environment Claim and the Subjective Prong
As the history of the Title VII hostile work environment claim illustrates, the
search for the correct standard to evaluate harassing conduct was the subject of
much debate in the period between the Supreme Court's decisions in Meritor and
Harris.-6 As the debate mainly concerned the correct objective standard to be
used, the subjective prong was not given much attention. The recent cases of
Kimzey, Hirase-Doi, and Faragher have opened the discussion of the place of the
subjective prong and the purposes this prong serves."t 7 The purposes of the
subjective prong must be analyzed in light of: (1) the evolution and gradual
"tortification" of the Title VII claim; and (2) the policy considerations for including
the subjective prong 28 Once the subjective prong is considered in these
contexts, the focus will shift to the inquiry of whether the subjective prong
accurately serves the purposes for which it was included, and whether these
121. Id. at 1162.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1162.
124. 864 F. Supp. 1552. 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
125. 76 F.3d at 1161.
126. Sees supra discussion in notes 66-67.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 91-110.
128. See Ifqra text accompanying notes 130-156.
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purposes will still be served if the subjective prong is expanded or eliminated from
the hostile work environment claim. 2
1. The "Tortification" of Title VII and the Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment Claim
Much of understanding why the subjective prong was included in the Supreme
Court's hostile work environment claim depends on understanding the nature of the
hostile work environment claim itself. The fundamental change in the nature of the
hostile work environment claim can be seen in the changes in the nature of the
claims brought and the expansion of the monetary awards available under Title VII.
Originally, the Title VII claim was viewed as a vehicle for protecting a class
of persons from discriminatory practices at the workplace."30 Title VII claims of
the 1960s and 1970s were seen as "a form of political expression to vindicate
important social rights."'' The courts regularly certified class action suits,
illustrating the view that such violations affected a class of people as a whole, and
were not "personal, private, claims."'32  Individual claimants were seen as
"private attorney general[s]" vindicating an important Congressional policy,'
not merely as plaintiffs seeking individual relief. Victim compensation, neverthe-
less, was also a policy concern, since the victim could recover compensatory
damages in the form of backpay for the individual harm suffered in addition to
injunctive relief." However, the focus on deterrence as well as compensation
in allowing such damages,' coupled with the conspicuous absence of damages
(both compensatory and punitive) available to tort victims, illustrates the basic
deterrent, class-based nature of the early Title VII claim. The concern that a hostile
working environment hindered productivity in the workplace, which had been a
major consideration in the enactment of Title VII, was reflected in the early
harassment cases.'6
129. See infra text accompanying notes 217-230.
130. Cheryl K. Zemelman, Note, The After.Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment
Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 175, 192 (1993).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 193.
133. Id. at 189 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.. 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 965
(1968)).
134. The Supreme Court case of Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405. 95 S. Ct. 2362
(1975). discusses the back pay provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Abermarle recognized that
the back pay provision helped "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past" as well as accomplishing the "make whole" purpose (compensation)
which was also a goal of Title VII. Abermarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18, 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72.
135. Id. at 421, 95 S. Ct. at 2373.
136. See George. supra note 22, at 4-5. That this was a major concern of Title VII is also
reflected in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), cited in
George, supra note 22.
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However, by the 1980s the Title VU class action had begun to disappear,
partially because suits under Title VII focused less on employers' failure to hire
and more on promotion and termination decisions.' 3' The deterrent purpose
behind the back pay provisions was obscured by the harm to individual dignity
that a victim may have suffered.' 38 In short, the Title VII plaintiff began to
resemble a tort plaintiff.1
39
The gradual shift in focus from deterrence to victim compensation
culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1991."4 For all cases to which this Act
applies, compensatory and punitive damages are available to employees who
suffered injury due to a hostile work environment.'' Victims thus are
compensated not only for the economic injury they suffered from sexual
harassment, but also for any psychological injury. Essentially, after the 1991
Act, the Title VII hostile work environment plaintiff can receive the same
damages as an intentional tort plaintiff.'42 The goal of tort law, "the compen-
sation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered
within the scope of their legally recognized interests," 4 3 has been adopted as
the goal of Title VII.'" While the professed goal of Title VII discrimination
claims is still protection of a certain class from workplace discrimination, 4  the
emphasis is now on compensation to individual victims for harm suffered from
intentional conduct (by the harasser) and negligent conduct (by the employer in
allowing such working conditions to exist). The objective/subjective prongs of
the Harris test' 46 reflect both the original goal (protection of a class) and the
more recent goal (compensation of the individual). The "reasonable person"
standard judges the conduct from a group standard (reflecting society's judgment
137. Zemelman, supra note 130, at 195-96.
138. Id
139. Id
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides:
In an action brought by a complaining party under ... 142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-
16) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under
... (42 U.S.C. J§ 2000e-2, 2000e3, or 2000e-16], and provided that the complaining
party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in
addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)]. from' respondent.
This provision was added and the existing remedies of backpay and injunctive relief were retained.
Congress made It express in the act that compensatory damages "shall not include backpay (or]
interest on backpay." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1) (1994). Thus, the compensatory damages envisioned
are all damages which do not include backpay.
141. Id
.142. Zemelman, supra note 130, at 196-97.
143. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 5-6 (5th ed. 1984).
144. Zemelman, supra note 130, at 196.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) makes the remedies exclusive to those who have suffered an injury
due to a civil rights violation.
146. Harris was decided in 1993, two years after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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of the conduct of harasser against a member of a protected class) and protects
the class of victims from economic harm, while the subjective standard measures
the effect of the "abusiveness" on the individual victim. 4"
The increasing similarity of Title VII claims to tort claims is reflected in the
language and logic of hostile work environment sexual harassment opinions.
Justice O'Connor noted the link between sexual harassment and tort law in her
dissent in United States v. Burke:48 "[Tihe purposes and operation of Title VII
are closely analogous to those of tort law, and that similarity should determine
excludability of recoveries for personal injury ... .""9 However, the similarity
between the hostile work environment claim and tort claims has also prompted
some to question the inclusion of the claim under Title VII. In Vinson v.
Taylor,' Judges Bork, Scalia and Starr dissented from a denial of rehearing en
banc of a decision holding an employer vicariously liable for the sexually harassing
acts of a supervisor. In an opinion written by Judge Bork, thejudges contended that
the panel's decision had gone too far in holding that an employer is vicariously
liable for an employee's alleged sexual harassment,"'1 and that such a rule "was
at odds with traditional practice which was not to hold employers liable at all for
their employee's intentional torts involving sexual escapades."'5  The majority
panel had conceded that in tort the employer would not be vicariously liable, but
nonetheless felt that the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex
mandated vicarious liability in Title VII sexual harassment cases.153 In a
footnote, the judges stated that "some of the doctrinal difficulty in this area is due
to the awkwardness of classifying sexual advances as 'discrimination,""'4 and
suggested that if harassment were to be classified as discrimination under Title VII,
147. Indeed, this phenomenon has led to criticism of the place of the sexual harassment claim
in anti-discrimination law. Scholars have noted that the unique nature of the sexual harassment claim
and its requirement that the complained-of conduct be "unwelcome." For a good discussion of the
scholarship surrounding the 'criticism of the sexual harassment claim and its place in anti-
discrimination law, see Anita Bernstein. Law. Culture, and Harassment. 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1227.
1242-51 (1994). Some scholars note the inappropriateness of Title VII remedies and the "rigidity
of state tort law" and call for a new independent cause of action in tort for sexual harassment. Krista
J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1461 (1986). For another article criticizing the sexual harassment claim as sex
discrimination and calling for an independent tort of sexual harassment, see Ellen F. Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 333 (1990).
Others, while stopping short of an independent tort for sexual harassment, have nonetheless called
for an overhaul of the sex discrimination laws. See Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of
Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328 (1988).
148. 504 U.S. 229, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
149. Id, at 249, 112 S. Ct. at 1878 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, Scalia, and Starr, Judges, dissenting). The claims
of Mechelle Vinson in Vinson v. Taylor were ultimately decided in Meritor Savings Bank. FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
151. 760 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
152. 1d at 1332.
153. Id. at 1333 n.6.
154. ld.
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"that decision at least demands adjustments for its subsidiary doctrines [i.e.
employer liability].""' The judges' uneasiness is prompted by the fact that the
Title VII harassment claim, while similar to an action in tort, results in a "strict
vicarious liability" standard that is not imposed on employers whose employees
engage in intentional misconduct in the workplace. 5 6
Whatever the criticism of the "tortification" of Title VII may be, the similarity
of tort claims to Title VII helps explain the inclusion and role of the subjective
prong in the hostile work environment claim. As the following discussion shows,
the purposes for which the subjective prong was included reflect the Court's more
recent emphasis on compensation for the individual under Title VII.
2. The Role of the Subjective Prong-Alteration of the Workplace
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Harris created a dual objec-
tive/subjective test to evaluate the harasser's conduct."7 The objective prong
evaluated the conduct from a "reasonable person" standard, concentrating on
whether the conduct is severe enough, according to what society would define as
"hostile" or "abusive.""s It did so to prevent "making actionable any conduct
that is merely offensive," thus protecting employers from the claims of hypersensi-
tive employees." 9 The Supreme Court required the subjective prong as a way of
determining whether the harassing conduct actually altered a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment for the particular plaintiff.'t" This is clear in its
statement: "[I]f the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be
abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's
employment, and there is no Title VII violation."''
The gradual "tortification" of the Title VII claim discussed above 62 helps
explain why the Harris Court required a subjective perception of the abusiveness
of the environment. The record of the oral arguments before the Supreme Court
155. Id (referring to Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
156. Id at 1333 n.7. Scalia's uneasiness can be seen later in Harris, where the idea of requiring
only a subjective perception of the abusiveness of the environment, and not actual harm as a tort
claim would require, preoccupied the justice. This is reflected in his statement in Harris that "the
class of plaintiffs seeking to recover in negligence is limited to those who have suffered harm,
whereas under this statute [Title VII] 'abusiveness' is to be the test of whether legal harm has been
suffered." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17. 24, 114 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1993). The
resulting "expansive vistas of litigation" would Include Title VII claims where the employer would
be required to compensate victims merely for an abusive environment, and not for their actual injuries
suffered from such an environment. Justice Scalia, however, did not fault the majority's
-requirements. Given the "inherently vague statutory language" of Title VII. he could find no
alternative to the course the Court had taken.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 68-80.
158. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 114 S. Ct. at 370.
159. Id at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
160. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
161. Id
162. See supra text accompanying notes 130-147.
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reveals that the subjective prong was added to ensure that the individual plaintiff
actually suffered from the abusive environment.' The objective requirement
without a subjective requirement could result in what one Justice termed "negli-
gence in the act."'" The subjective prong can thus be seen as fulfilling the
"damage" element in tort. Ironically, the Court, in requiring only subjective
perception of the hostility of the workplace, was rejecting the requirement of
Rabiduet"s that the victim suffer actual "damage."'" For those like Scalia,
Bork, and Starr who feel that the harassment paradigm needs "adjustments," the
use of the subjective prong alone in determining injury may be inadequate.'6
3. The Role of the Subjective Prong-Unwelcomeness
The subjective prong, however, serves purposes other than just ensuring that
the individual claimant suffer injury requiring compensation.'" Although it
was not expressed in Harris, the subjective prong also influences whether
conduct will be perceived as "unwelcome" or not.t"e Meritor required that the
plaintiff prove, as part of her prima facie case, that the harassing conduct was
"unwelcome."'" If the employee must find the harassing conduct unwelcome,
163. In the arguments before the Court, Jeffrey P. Minear, representing the United States as
amicus curiae, argued for only an objective standard. The exchange between Minear and the Justices
includes:
QUESTION: Do you have both an objective and a subjective component to "make more
difficult"?
MR. MINEAR: For that standard, Your Honor, we have only an objective compo-
nent. ...
QUESTION: Why isn't that predicating liability with an injury? You're saying-I mean.
Isn't that the equivalent of saying anyone who drives a car without due care is going to
be liable whether or not he bumps into somebody or not?
MR. MINEAR: No. The injury here, Your Honor, is with respect to being denied the
right to a discrimination-free employment place, and our test goes to whether or not there
is discrimination in the workplace. The person can be injured even though the person
does not have compensable damages....
QUESTION: I take it the unwelcome component of the test, which is not involved here,
is to satisfy some subjective-
MR. MINEAR: That is correct.
QUESTION: -- requirement, and makes this not just like negligence in the act.
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 9, No. 92-1168.
1993 WL 757644 (Oct. 13, 1993).
The fact that the Supreme Court subsequently included the subjective prong can be seen, in light
of this exchange, as a reflection of its concern that the victim personally suffer harm from the
workplace.
164. See supra note 163.
165. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)
166. Rabldue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
167. See supra note 156.
168. See infra notes 169-170.
169. Mertor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2406 (1986).
170. 1&
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it follows that she must, at some point, perceive the conduct to be such. Thus
the subjective perception of the offensiveness of the behavior can be seen to
some extent as co-extensive with the requirement that the conduct was
unwelcome. 7'
The requirement of "unwelcomeness" was included in the primafacie hostile
work environment claim so that consensual sexual conduct between employees
would not come under the purview of Title VII.111 It was also included to
serve as a "signal" to the harasser that the employee found the conduct
offensive'" If the reason for including the subjective prong was to show that
this employee found the conduct offensive, then the unwelcomeness prong is the
requirement that the victim manifest this offensiveness (or, at least, her
unwillingness to participate in the sexually offensive conduct) to the harasser.
Why this is important can be seen in the Harris case itself. At trial,"14
defendant offered testimony that the other female Forklift employees did not find
the harasser's behavior to be offensive." This behavior, though, was later
found to be objectively "hostile" by the Supreme Court."16 In a situation where
one employee is offended by the hostility of the workplace and others are not,
a manifestation of "unwelcomeness" by the offended employee is especially
important."'
Unfortunately, whether conduct is "unwelcome" is not always apparent at first
glance. Even a relationship that is voluntary, as in Meritor, is not necessarily
171. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc..
supra note 163. The United States argued that the "unwelcomeness" requirement took care of the
subjective requirement and therefore advocated the adoption of the objective prong only. The Court's
question that the unwelcomeness prong would take care of "some subjective requirement"
acknowledges that it sees the unwelcomeness prong as requiring some form of subjective perception.
That the subjective prong and the unwelcomeness prong are interrelated is also reflected in Balletti
v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1995). which defines the subjective prong in terms
of the unwelcomeness requirement (correct inquiry in determining whether employee subjectively
perceived work environment as abusive is whether employee by his or her conduct indicated that
complained-of behavior was unwelcome).
172. See Sarah E. Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What Is It and How Should
It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 357. 411
(1994-1995).
173. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 68, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2406 (1986):
"The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome."
174. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4.1991).
175. Id. at 4.
176. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
177. The district court in Harris, in comparing Harris with the plaintiff in Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). stated that "[the plaintiff in Rabiduel was able to show
that the offensive conduct was severe enough to annoy her female co-workers, which Ms. Harris had
been unable to show." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 4. 1991). The Supreme Court, in rejecting this argument, centers the attention of the court
to the reaction of the plaintiff herself in a sexual harassment claim.
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welcome, as long as the employee indicates that it is unwelcome. 17  According
to Meritor. "unwelcomeness" must be judged by looking at the "totality of the
circumstances." 179 Recent cases show that the courts will consider a variety of
factors in determining whether the conduct was unwelcome, including whether the
victim used crude language,'"o whether the victim registered a complaint,' and
whether the victim and the harasser interacted socially."' And while the
unwelcomeness requirement has been criticized,"' the "signaling" function it
performs is crucial in a workplace. Conduct that the harasser may not intend to be
offensive can rise to the level of "hostile" or "abusive" when continued over
time."' One of the reasons the unwelcomeness prong was included was to avoid
penalizing an "unwitting" harrasser in cases where some may not be offended and
no clear signal was sent that the conduct was unwelcome.8 5
The importance of the "unwelcomeness" requirement makes the subjective
perception of the offensiveness of the behavior even more important. The signal
sent to the employer may be necessary for recovery in a hostile work environment
claim.'" Thus the idea that an employee may subjectively perceive the conduct
as offensive and therefore unwelcome after-the-fact or after employment becomes
problematic in light of the "signaling" purpose the subjective prong provides.
B. The Role of the Subjective Prong and Post-Employment Realization
1. After-the-Fact/Post-Employment Realization
The subjective prong required by the language of Harris does not mandate that
the conduct in question be perceived as offensive at the exact moment the conduct
178. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69, 106 S. Ct. at 2406.
179. Id.
180. See Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994), in which Judge Posner
rejected the lower court's determination that the conduct was welcome, as victim was not only a
recipient of crude behavior and crude language but also "dished it out." Judge Posner's insightful
opinion criticizes the notion of "welcome sexual harassment," which he considers an "oxymoron."
181. See Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
182. See Fowler v. Sunrise Carpet Indus., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1996), in which
plaintiff's having lunch with male supervisor and giving him Christmas gifts did not make harassing
conduct any less welcome.
183. See George, supra note 22, at 1: see also Judge Posner's comment, supra note 180.
184. See. e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.. 510 U.S. 17, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
185. Michael D. Vhay, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual
Harassment, 55 Chi. L. Rev. 328, 344 (1988).
186. The last prong of the test under Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir. 1982),
Is that the employer knew or should have known of the harassing conduct. In some cases, this
"signaling" by the employee may be the only notice employer has. For a good discussion of
employer liability In sexual harassment cases, see David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the
Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors. 81 Comell L. Rev. 66 (1995).
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occurs. 87 The court in Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.lo rejected this notion,
saying that "[tihe Court does not rigidly require that a plaintiff form a well-defined,
subjective belief of hostility at the exact moment the incident occurs.""8 9 More
importantly, neitherof the reasons for requiring the subjective prong is undermined
by an after-the-fact realization."0 The employee's subjective perception of the
hostility of the workplace at any time during her employment will result in the
requisite altering of a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment. 9 ' In
addition. further offensive behavior by a harasser will be perceived, and (hopefully)
manifested as "unwelcome" by the harassee. The employee will be able to "signal"
her distaste of the conduct in question.
The more difficult case is that presented by Faragher. If the victim does not
perceive the conduct to be offensive during her employment, then how can a "term,
condition, or privilege" of employment be altered, as required by Harris? The
Eleventh Circuit said that it could not. However, the language of Harris does not
mandate that the subjective perception occur during employment. It merely says
that if such a perception does not occur, then the conduct in question has not altered
the conditions of employment.'92 One could say that the employee subjectively
perceived the workplace to have been abusive after the conduct occurred (which
happened to be after the employment was terminated), and the employee, at that
moment, also perceived the extent to which her workplace had been altered. The
requisite "alteration" of the workplace can be said to have occurred.9 3
Admittedly this interpretation is stretching the language of Harris. However,
if the requirement of the subjective prong is to ensure that the workplace has been
altered and the plaintiff in question has suffered some harm, then a showing of
acuaal psychological damage may ensure that the purpose behind requiring the
subjective prong--to show some "damage" or "injury'-is fulfilled.
More difficult to reconcile to a post-employment subjective perception is the
"signaling" function the subjective prong also serves. The allowance of a post-
employment realization of the offensiveness will result in allowing the employee
to recover in situations where the employee did not signal the unwelcomeness of
the conduct to the employer.'" In situations where the harassment was
187. 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
188. 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
189. Id at 1312.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 169-171.
191. Id
192. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.. 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
193. The use of the term "alteration" was discussed in oral arguments before the Supreme Court.
One Justice recognized that perhaps "alteration of the workplace" was not an all-inclusive term, as
it did not necessarily include situations in which an employee enters an already abusive environment.
See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., supra note
163, at 12. The term may be imprecise for cases such as these-when the perception occurs after
the conduct. The workplace can no longer, in a sense, be "altered," and yet the hostility of the
workplace may have resulted in psychological injury to plaintiff.
194. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Mo. 1995). If the plaintiff
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intentional and the hostility of the environment was felt by others in the workplace,
the signaling by one employee may not be necessary for a manifestation of the
unwelcomeness of the conduct in general.' 9' The situation in Hirase-Doi v. U.S.
West Communications, Inc.,'" discussed previously, is an example of this. The
court held that the plaintiff could rely on evidence of her co-employee's harassment
of other women to the extent that it affected her general work atmosphere. 9' In.
cases where the co-employee's harassment is widespread, the employer could be
put on notice "even though employer may not have known that this particular
plaintiff was one of perpetrator's victims."'"
More difficult is the situation like that of Harris, in which the conduct in
question was not perceived as offensive by anyone other than the plaintiff herself.
The harasser himself may not realize that the conduct in question offended; indeed,
he may feel that such behavior is part of the "shop" atmosphere in which he works.
Both harasser and employer will be shocked when the employee, who perceived no
hostility and manifested no displeasure at the conduct during her employment, sues
after termination for damages sustained as a result of the hostility of the environ-
ment. The idea of punishing both harasser and employer for conduct that was
seemingly welcome penalizes both for engaging in any sexually charged conduct.
Thus, in theory, any sexually oriented comment at the workplace could be viewed
as sexual harassment and even consensual sexual repartee could later be character-
ized as "unwelcome," and thus violative of Title VII.
To allow this would be to push Title VII too far. The "unwelcomeness"
requirement was included to protect both men and women who engage in
consensual sexual relationships at work.'" If this protection is eliminated, then
the sexual harassment claim could potentially exist in any relationship. Employers
could thus discourage or disallow any relationship among co-employees on the
grounds that such conduct constitutes sexual harassment. Even worse, the sexual
harassment claim could become a retaliatory tool for the jilted lover or the fired
employee. Co-employees who were not the targets of "harassing" conduct could
sue when they realize that other co-workers are recovering for offensive conduct
(and not that they were harassed).
Such is one dark end of the spectrum in allowing a post-employment
realization of the offensiveness of the workplace conduct. The other end of the
spectrum-.the evil of disallowing post-employment realization of the offensiveness
of the conduct-must also be considered. Consider the following scenario: an
employee is subjected to a workplace that is objectively "hostile." As the court in
in this case had left before she realized that the conduct was offensive, we would have exactly this
problem.
195. The employer may not be able to claim that it was unaware of the hostility of the work
environment. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995).
196. Hirase.Doi, 61 F.3d 777.
197. Id. at 782.
198. ld. at 783.
199. See Vhay. supra note 185.
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Klmzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.20 envisioned, the employee at first does not
want to believe that the employer is engaging in hostile behavior. At first, she
ignores it, then justifies it to herself. She is at the point where she is about to
realize the impact that the behavior actually has on her when she is terminated. She
goes to a psychologist and is found to be suffering from severe depression brought
on by the harassment. She has no claim, however, as she has not, during her
employment, "subjectively perceived" her workplace to be hostile.
This example illustrates how Harris' requirement of subjective perception can
limit valid claims. It shows how the Court in Harris failed to include in its analysis
conduct that either causes serious psychological harm or affects the conditions of
employment without the employee realizing it. The Court, in relying on the
assumption that subjective perception of the conduct during employment is
necessary or the employment to be affected, failed to consider the effects that
sexual harassment has on a woman from a psychological standpoint, women's
varying reactions to sexual harassment, and the possibility that such conduct could
affect a woman's psychological well-being and employment without her realizing
it for some time.
2. The Subjective Perception Requirement Viewed in Light of the
Psychological Implications of Sexual Harassment
Psychological studies on how women react to hostile work environment
sexual harassment are still in their infancy, partly because the sexual harassment
claim arose long before a coherent body of research had been done on the
subject." That psychologists are struggling to keep up with the proliferation
of the sexual harassment claim is reflected in the fact that much of the scientific
research on sexual harassment has been influenced by the EEOC's definitions of
sexual harassment and the problems in assessing sexual harassment that the
courts themselves faced. 2
200. 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Miss. 1995).
201. See Louise F. Fitzgerald and Sandra L. Shullman, Sexual Harassment: A Research Analysis
and Agenda for the 1990s, 42 J. Vocational.Behav. 5, 6 (1993).
Since this note concentrates on sexual harassment by men against women, the psychological
literature quoted will refer to women's, and not men's, reactions to sexual harassment.
202. I It is interesting to note that many of the studies on perception of sexual harassment in
the past few years have concentrated on the differences of perception of sexual harassment according
to certain "rater effects" such as gender and age. This reflects psychologists' response to the legal
debate over whether a "reasonable person" or "reasonable woman" standard would make a difference
in adjudicating the behavior. For examples of such studies, see Jeanette N. Cleveland and Melinda
E. Kerst, Sexual Harassment and Perceptions of Power: An Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J.
Vocational Behav. 49 (1993); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 4; Margaret S. Stockdate et a.,
Acknowledging Sexual Harassment: A Test of Alternative Models. 17(4) Basic and Applied Social
Psychology 469 (1995): Paula M. Popovich et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment as a Function
of Sex of Rater and Incident Form and Consequence, 27 Sex Roles Nos. 11/12 (1992).
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As psychologists have begun to understand what behaviors are perceived as
sexual harassment by different groups of people, their attention is turning more
to the effects that sexual harassment has on women and the coping mechanisms
women use to deal with it.2 3  Two new areas of research have
emerged-victim responses and organizational factors.20' It is within the area
of victim responses to sexual harassment that future psychological studies may
be helpful for courts and lawyers in determining exactly what can constitute
"subjective perception" of sexual harassment.
Victims of sexual harassment respond differently. Much of how a victim
reacts depends on her background, education and job position.2°3 One study
has divided the responses into two categories: those which are internally focused
(including endurance, denial, detachment, relabeling, and illusory control) and
those which are externally focused (avoidance, appeasement, assertion, reporting,
and seeking social support).20  Some of the internally focused responses show
the tendency of some victims not to recognize the behavior of the harasser as
improper and to blame themselves for the harassment. 7 This is especially
understandable in situations where the harassment begins with minor incidents
and slowly escalates. As one leading study stated: "A woman who is harassed
may be unsure at first if what she is experiencing really is harassment .... "20 8
Moreover, women may be conditioned to accept the conduct by other co-workers
or family members who would blame the victim rather than the harasser.2'
Other studies of the effects of sexual harassment on the victim and her
coping responses to the conduct in question have revealed that self-doubt, denial,
and guilt are common reactions in the first stages of sexual harassment.'
This being so, it is quite possible that a victim may not perceive the conduct as
offensive at the time it occurs, mainly because she is blaming herself for the
harasser's conduct, or at least blaming herself for thinking that the harasser is out
of line. The tendency of the victim to blame herself is more prevalent (and more
understandable) when the harasser is a superior and not a mere co-worker."'
203. See Barbara A. Gutek and Mary P. Koss, Changed Woman and Changed Organizations:
Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment. 42 J. Vocational Behav. 28 (1993).
204. Fitzgerald and Shullman, supra note 201.
205. Gutek and Koss. supra note 203.
206. Fitzgerald and Shullman, supra note 201, at 14 (citing a study by L.F. Fitzgerald et at.,
Responses to VIctimization: Validation of an Objective Inventory to Assess Strategies for Responding
to Sexual Harassment).
207. Sara B. Samoluk and Grace M. H. Petty, The Impact of Sexual Harassment Simulations on
Women's Thoughts and Feelings, 30 Sex Roles, 679, 689 (1994).
208. Cutek and Koss, supra note 203.
209. h4
210. For a good exposition on the different stages of reactions to sexual harassment, see Robert
H. Woody and Nancy W. Perry, Sexual Harassment Victims: Psycholegal and Family Therapy
Considerations, 21 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 136 (1993). For a study of the impact of sexual harassment
on depression and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, see Gutek and Koss, supra note 203.
211. See generally Cleveland and Kerst, supra note 202. See also Samoluk and Petty, supra
note 207, at 693-94.
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One thing that is clear from the studies is that sexual harassment negatively
affects the victim both physically and psychologically, regardless of whether the
victim is actually aware of how pervasive or offensive the behavior is at the time
of the conduct.212 Many victims carry on their work numbly and only feel the
onslaught of the effects of sexual harassment in the form of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder." Women often do not attribute their depression and other
problems to their work environment until after they are out of it (and realize
exactly what the problem was).214
Research has shown that women can suffer psychological injury from sexual
harassment without perceiving the hostility of the workplace during their time of
employment.2ts Since this is the case, the subjective prong of Harris must be
reevaluated in light of these findings. If compensation for injury is one of the
reasons for allowing compensatory damages under Title VII, it makes sense that
those who actually suffer psychological injury from the hostile work environment
should recover regardless of when they became aware of the nature of the
harassing conduct. Indeed, the Harris Court explicitly stated that it wanted to
allow recovery to victims of a hostile work environment before they got to the
point of depression, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and other psychological
injury.2 16
C. Practical Considerations and Conclusions
The scientific research on women's reactions to sexual harassment shows the
burden that the subjective prong can impose upon some sexual harassment
plaintiffs and discounts the notion that the subjective prong is "easy" for theplaintiff to satisfy.217 The hard question of what to do with the subjective
212. See Jennifer L. Vinciguerra, The Present State of Sexual Harassment Law: Perpetuating
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Harassed Women, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 301, 316-17
(1994): 'it has been found that '[alny traumatic incident challenges a victim's belief that the world
is safe and predictable, attacks the victim's former sense of personal invulnerability, and disrupts the
victim's basic sense of self-trust and trust in the environment' Although sexual harassment clearly
fits this definition of a traumatic event, sexual harassment has not been universally considered one
of the stressors that causes PTSD." This article makes a persuasive argument that "Sexual
Harassment Stress Disorder" should be recognized as a form of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
213. Gutek and Koss, supra note 203, at 33-34.
214. This is true when women-feel that the sexual harassment was their fault, i.e. they internalize
the trauma. See Vinciguerra, supra note 212, at 323.
215. Samoluk and Petty, supra note 207, at 694-96.
216. Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc., 510 U.S. 17. 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-371 (1993).
217. While some have criticized the subjective prong (see Jolynn Childers, Is There Place for
a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment, 42 Duke L.J. 854, 876 (1993)), others contend that the subjective prong adds no
burden to the Title VII plaintiff. See Kerry A. Colson, Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc.: The Supreme
Court Moves One Step Closer to Establishing a Workable Definition for Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment Claims, 30 New Eng. L. Rev. 441, 472 (1996) ("The addition of the subjective
component does not place a greater burden on the plaintiff. In fact, the subjective prong is easily met
1368 [Vol. 57
NOTES
prong still remains. As discussed earlier, eliminating the prong entirely would
result in the elimination of the "signaling" function that is crucial in the sexual
harassment claim.2  As shown above, requiring it may deny recovery to
victims of sexual harassment who suffer psychological injury after their
employment. The fairest solution may lie in changing the role of the subjective
prong of the hostile work environment claim so that both concerns-the
"signaling" of harassment and compensation of the victim of harassment--are
met.
Several possibilities of how to treat the subjective prong come to mind: (1)
one could continue to require a contemporaneous realization of the hostility of
the conduct; (2) one could continue to require a subjective perception of the
offensiveness of the conduct, but allow this to take place after the conduct has
actually occurred; (3) one could require the employee to prove she subjectively
perceived the conduct as offensive only if the employer offers evidence to the
contrary (i.e. move the requirement from the prima facie case to the affirmative
defense); (4) one could require proof of subjective perception only to establish
the amount of damages suffered by the victim; and (5) one could argue that the
subjective element is already met in the unwelcomeness requirement, and
eliminate the "double subjective element" from the Harris test.
The first option could be titled "The Status Quo." There is a certain logic
to keeping the subjective requirement as is. As discussed earlier, it is a way of
showing that the victim's employment was discriminatorily altered.219 In this
sense, requiring the subjective prong would thus satisfy the "tort" aspect of the
Title VII claim in that it would assure that the victim herself actually was
offended by the hostile work environment and therefore suffered actual damage.
Requiring the subjective prong also helps employers prevent sexual harassment
from creating a hostile work environment as the employee is more likely to
signal that the conduct is unwelcome and thus harassing. It helps the trier of fact
determine, based on the manifestations of the employee, whether the employer
knew or should have known of the alleged conduct. It protects employers from
claims of former employees and those who voluntarily entered into a sexual
relationship with a co-worker that later soured, and from claims of former
employees who were not actually affected by the harassment. Finally, requiring
the subjective prong may in the future reduce the burden imposed upon the
judicial system by the recent multiplication of hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims.rn
and can help the plaintiff establish the objective prong of the test."); Leah R. McCaslin, Harris v.
Forklift Systems. Inc.: Defining the Plaintiffs Burden in Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims, 29 Tulsa U. 761. 776 (1994) ("[T]he subjective element of the test is not, in
practice, an added burden that the plaintiff must overcome in order to recover under Title VII.").
218. See supra text accompanying notes 194.200.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 163-166.
220. The numbers speak for themselves: 3000 hostile work environment claims were filed with
the EEOC in 1991; 7000 claims were filed in 1993; 15,000+ claims were filed In 1995. See Joyce
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The weaknesses of some of these arguments have already been espoused in
this paper. First, if the signaling of the offensiveness of the behavior is a
concern, it is unclear how this requirement adds any more towards this end than
the requirement that the conduct be "unwelcome.'"" Second, if the subjective
requirement is necessary to satisfy a "damage" element of the claim, then why
must the subjective perception of the hostile work environment be contemporane-
ous with the objectionable behavior itself? If a victim can prove that she
suffered Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or other actual psychological injury, then
why should she be unable to recover? In this sense, it is hard to see why a
showing that the workplace has not been altered should exclude cases involving
severe psychological injury. Third, while requiring a subjective element may
help keep sexual harassment claims down, it is hard to see how this goal is
desirable if sexual harassment is indeed prevalent in our society.
The second possibility, allowing an ex post facto realization of the
offensiveness of the work environment, would allow recovery for victims who
suffer psychological injury without realizing the effect of the work environment
at the time. This would be in keeping with the compensatory nature of Title VII,
and the goal espoused in Harris to protect those psychologically harmed by a
hostile work environment.1 2 It would also be in keeping with the prophylactic
scope of Title VII-an ex-employee could sue in her capacity as a representative
of a protected class to eliminate discrimination where it exists. However, this
approach suffers from some theoretical drawbacks. If the conduct is not
perceived as offensive during the victim's employment, then the employee may
not have signaled the unwelcomeness of the conduct to the harasser. As
discussed previously, the danger in allowing such claims is the room for
abuse by those not actually harmed by the workplace. The damage awards now
available to Title VII plaintiffs will more likely make "big money" instead of the
elimination of discrimination, the motivation of many Title VII plaintiffs. 4
The third possibility is a compromise between requiring and not requiring
a subjective element. It involves shifting burdens of proof. Under this analysis,
the employee would not be required to prove a subjective element in her prima
facie case of sexual harassment; however, if the employer could establish some
facts that would indicate a lack of subjective perception on the part of the
victims, the burden would shift back to the victim to show that the conditions of
L. Kennedy, Sexual Harassment Is a Problem That Refuses to Die, Star-Tribune (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), April 9. 1995; Ellen Neubome, Sex Harassment Suits Soar: Complaints High From Women
in Blue-collar Jobs, USA Today, May 3, 1996, at AI.
221. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
supra note 163, at 9. The position of the United States as amicus curiae was that the subjective
prong was not necessary, as the unwelcomeness prong included a subjective element in it.
222. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21. 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
223. See supra text accompanying note 194-200.
224. The punitive damages available to plaintiffs is incentive enough to sue. In the recent case
of Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Mo. 1995), the trial court reduced a
jury award of $50 million in punitive damages to $5 million.
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her employment were actually altered by the conduct in question. Thus, while
subjective perception of the conduct in question would no longer be an element
of the sexual harassment claim, the lack thereof could be brought up by the
defense.' This approach would have the advantage of not limiting the effect
of the harassment to cases where the victim has actually perceived the
abusiveness of the conduct at the time of employment, while protecting the
employer from a certain extent from frivolous claims.
However, this approach may be ineffective in practice. As cases such as
Klmzey, Hirase-Doi and Faragher show, the defendant will more likely than not
challenge the plaintiff's subjective perception of the workplace when there is a
question of whether the employee sufficiently manifested the "unwelcomeness"
of the conduct.Y Since the employee would still be required to prove that the
conduct was unwelcome as part of her prima facie case, the victim would still
have the burden of proving that she perceived the conduct to be offensive and
that she manifested this to her employer.
The fourth approach is a variation of the third approach. The employee
would not be required to prove a subjective element in order to prove a hostile
work environment. The proof of subjective realization of the offensiveness of
the conduct would be required in the proof of damages. This would allow the
employee to bring a claim for hostile work environment to obtain injunctive
relief or compensation for economic losses, but would discourage an employee
from bringing a claim for "big money" when she did not manifest any perception
of the hostility of the workplace. This approach would reflect the theoretical
division between discrimination and tort discussed above:22 the victim would
have an anti-discrimination claim under Title VII in which she would represent
the interests of a class (in this case women) in eliminating discrimination. To
recover for personal injury suffered, the victim would have to prove, via the
subjective requirement, actual damage (as in tort). Thus, if the plaintiff can
prove an objectively hostile work environment, then she can obtain injunctive
relief or backpay (the original remedies available for a Title VII claimant). If
she can prove that she suffered because of the altered work environment, she can
claim compensatory (and possibly punitive) damages for this injury. This would
have the advantage of discouraging frivolous claims, as the employee would not
have the incentive of "big money" to sue without some showing that she was
either harmed by the workplace or that the conditions of her workplace were
altered.
225. Interestingly enough, this "burden shifting" approach has been proposed by another author
for the "unwelcomeness" requirement. Reasoning that the "unwelcomeness" requirement in the prima
facie case results in a "victim focus" effect much like what occurs in a rape trial. Glenn George
proposes that this requirement be eliminated from the prima face case of sexual harassment and be
raised, if necessary, by the defendant as an affirmative defense. See George, supra note 22, at 1.
226. See also Balletti .v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1995). cited supra note
181,
227. See supra text accompanying notes 146-147.
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Finally, an argument can be made that we can do without a separate
subjective prong altogether. If the argument is that the subjective prong is
necessary to establish that the conduct in question was "unwelcome," the
counterargument is that a separate subjective prong is not necessary to prove
unwelcomeness, as that element is already part of the prima facie claim. The
plaintiff already has the burden of proving that the conduct (1) was unwelcome;
(2) was not objectively reasonable; and (3) was known or constructively known
by the employer (respondeat superior). Eliminating the subjective prong would
take into account the double subjective element now present in the hostile work
environment claim. The subjective prong is not necessary for "signaling"
purposes if a manifestation of "unwelcomeness" is required. And if one views
the injury as something other than "alteration of the workplace," then the
subjective prong may not be necessary to determine whether an injury has
occurred. The United States, as amicus curiae in Harris, argued that the injury
suffered from the hostile work environment lies not in the alteration of the
workplace, but in "being denied the right to a discrimination-free employment
place."tm If this is injury enough for a Title VII violation, then a subjective
perception of the hostility of the workplace may not be necessary, as the right
would be infringed regardless of whether the employee was aware of it during
the period of employment or not.
Of these alternatives, the fourth approach, requiring the subjective prong in
the proof of damages, may be better than simply eliminating the subjective prong
or always allowing it to be met by an after-the-fact realization of the offensive-
ness of the conduct. Both of these alternatives create the possibility of opening
the floodgates to any former co-worker of a sexual harassment plaintiff. This
might defeat one of the purposes requiring the subjective prong, as there is some
literature that suggests that the subjective prong was added as a limit to such
"indirect effects."' 9 However, allowing the subjective prong to be considered
after the hostile work environment has already been established will allow
plaintiffs who have suffered post employment psychological injury to be
compensated for their injury. This approach may also be the most theoretically
consistent with the purposes of including the subjective prong. The plaintiff will
still have to prove "unwelcomeness" as part of her prima facie claim, and thus
the perception of the offensive conduct and the "signaling" function of the
subjective prong will be met. Only when proving damages will the plaintiff have
to rely on either her subjective perception of the alteration of the workplace or
actual damages resulting from the hostile workplace.
Ultimately, the question of whether the employee perceived the conduct as
offensive and unwelcome will depend on the circumstances surrounding her
228. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
supra note 163, at 9. See supra note 163 for excerpt of exchange between the Justices and the
attorney for the United States.
229. See Burns, supra note 172, at 357 n.436.
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claim. The credibility of the plaintiff and the validity of the claim will always,
no matter what test is used, be a question for the trier of fact. In Faragher, the
court believed one plaintiff's assertion that she had found the work environment
hostile during the time of her employment, but did not believe the other plaintiff.
Such is the case. Neither plaintiff in Faragher presented the evidence of
psychological injury resulting from the hostile work environment. Neither
plaintiff, in fact, had a very compelling case on the merits.23 However, this
case raised some compelling issues regarding the nature of the hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim. If cases like Faragher continue to arise,
the courts will be forced to evaluate the subjective prong in light of the purposes
it was meant to serve and the reality of the psychological effects of sexual
harassment.
Catherine M. Maraist
230. At least not in this author's view. The fact that one plaintiff requested reemployment and
the other did not discourage her sister from seeking employment at the same place does not bolster
the argument that they found the workplace hostile during or after their employ.
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